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The ability of animals to monitor their own cognitive processes is called metacognition. In this issue of
Neuron, Middlebrooks and Sommer (2012) show that single-unit activity of SEF neurons exhibit a
metacognitive signal while monkeys perform a postdecision wagering task.When you look into a convex mirror, you
will see yourself looking into the mirror
(Figure 1A). You might pick up the mirror
and move it around your face. Then you
will see yourself reflected at various
angles under the control of your hand’s
movement. Like the mirror reflecting us,
we are endowedwith the ability tomonitor
our own thoughts and cognition from
various aspects. This ability is termed
metacognition (Flavell, 1979). For in-
stance, if you are cramming for an
upcoming history exam, you may decide
to focus on the material that you feel you
understand the least. Or when you are
reading a difficult book, you may reread
a paragraph if you feel you did not initially
grasp its meaning, and in some cases you
may look up background information in an
encyclopedia. Metacognition is the pro-
cess by which you make a judgment on
the basis of introspection of your own
cognitive state. In this way, metacognition
allows you to assess and regulate the
current state of your cognitive activity so
that you can determine how to act in
a given situation (Dunlosky and Metcalfe,
2009).
Localization of metacognitive func-
tioning in the human brain was attempted
in a neuropsychological study of specific
frontal lesions (Schnyer et al., 2004) and
in an fMRI study of healthy subjects (Kikyo
et al., 2002; Maril et al., 2003). Some
frontal areas were found to be recruited
when participants experienced a ‘‘feeling
of knowing’’ what was to be recalled
(Kikyo et al., 2002). Metacognitive ability
had been thought to be unique to hu-
mans; however, recent studies show that
rhesus monkeys also exhibit metacogni-
tive behavior when performing cognitive358 Neuron 75, August 9, 2012 ª2012 Elsevitasks (Hampton, 2001; Kiani and Shadlen,
2009; Kornell et al., 2007). Monkeys are
capable of making reasonable ‘‘bets’’ on
whether they were correct or incorrect in
a perceptual or mnemonic test they had
just taken. In this issue ofNeuron, Middle-
brooks and Sommer (2012) recorded the
spiking activity of single neurons in the
macaque frontal cortex during ametacog-
nitive task (Figure 1B). This study is novel
in its use of electrophysiology with high
temporal and spatial resolution to capture
a metacognitive process in macaque
frontal cortex, a neural substrate that is
shared by humans and monkeys.
The authors investigated the neuronal
correlates of metacognition in this study
using a postdecision wagering task (Mid-
dlebrooks and Sommer, 2011). This task
comprised two stages (Figure 1B). In the
first stage, monkeys performed an occu-
lomotor delayed response to a presented
cue stimulus (decision stage). Task diffi-
culty was manipulated by randomly
changing the time interval between the
cue stimulus and the subsequent mask
(stimulus onset asynchrony, SOA). After
the decision (i.e., occulomotor response),
and following a subsequent delay period,
the monkeys chose one of two options by
making another saccade (bet stage). One
of the options (‘‘high-bet’’) offered a larger
reward only if the monkey made a correct
saccade at the preceding decision stage,
whereas the other option (‘‘low-bet’’)
guaranteed a smaller, but certain, reward
regardless of whether the monkey made
a correct decision. To earn the largest
reward, the animals had to monitor their
own decision in each trial and choose an
appropriate option on the basis of a confi-
dence in the decision, and this process iser Inc.metacognitive. The authors conducted
single-unit recordings while the animals
performed this task, which enabled them
to examine the metacognitive signal at
the single neuron level. They recorded
the neuronal activity from three different
areas in the frontal cortex (frontal eye field
[FEF], dorsolateral prefrontal cortex [PFC],
and supplementary eye field [SEF]) and
examined which of these areas is most
involved in metacognition.
Behavioral analysis first revealed that
the monkeys performed this task as ex-
pected: the animals indeed made a
correct decision more frequently when
they chose the high-bet compared to
when they chose the low-bet. This was
true for each SOA, indicating that the
monkeys placed their bets on the basis
of trial-by-trial monitoring of their own
decision, and not just on the basis of
task difficulty.
Single-unit activity during this task was
then analyzed for the FEF, PFC, and SEF
in the frontal cortex. First, the authors
compared neuronal activity for correct
and incorrect decisions at the decision
stage and found that all three areas
exhibited significant increases in activity
when the decision was correct. They
next focused on activity during the time
period between the decision and bet
stages (interstage period). The authors
hypothesized that the neuronal activity
during this period would probably link
the animal’s decision and the subsequent
bet, and thus encode the metacognitive
signal. If neuronal activity encodes the
animal’s metacognition, there should be
differences in activity between high- and
low-bet conditions even for the same
preceding decision. During the interstage
Figure 1. Metacognition in Macaque Monkeys: Frontoparietal Network for Decision Monitoring
(A) Metacognition is the ability to think about one’s own thinking. In this picture, a man views himself reflected by a convex mirror (from Parmigianino’s ‘‘Self-
portrait in a Convex Mirror’’).
(B) In Middlebrooks and Sommer (2012), monkeys first detected and reported the location of a peripheral target (decision stage) and then made a bet based on
their decision (bet stage). When the monkeys chose the ‘‘high bet’’ (red circle), they earned the maximum reward for a correct decision but faced a penalty of
a timeout without a reward for an incorrect decision. When the monkeys chose the ‘‘low bet’’ (green circle), they earned a minimal reward irrespective of the
correctness of the decision.
(C) Metacognition-related areas in which single-unit activity has been investigated so far. The red circles indicate the areas in which activity was recorded in the
present study. The gray circles correspond to the areas targeted in monkeys by Kiani and Shadlen (2009) or in rats by Kepecs et al. (2008). The black arrows
indicate anatomical connections (Cavada et al., 2000; Lynch and Tian, 2006).
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PFC was indistinguishable when different
bets were made following the same
correct decision. However, SEF neurons
exhibited significant differences in activity
when high- and low-bets were made
following the same correct decision. The
activity was on average stronger for the
high-bet compared to the low-bet. These
results suggest that the activity of SEF
neurons, but not that of PFC or FEF
neurons, reflected the monkey’s decision
monitoring for the subsequent wagering.
The activity of SEF neurons has been
shown to encode the animal’s anticipa-
tion of a reward (Roesch and Olson,
2003; So and Stuphorn, 2010). Therefore,
an important issue regarding the ob-
served metacognitive signal is the in-
volvement of reward anticipation. To
address this, the authors examined differ-
ences in activity when the same bet was
preceded by different (correct or incor-
rect) decisions. They hypothesized that
SEF activity would be indistinguishable
in these conditions if it encodes reward
anticipation. They found that the activity
of SEF neurons during the interstage
period showed a significant difference
between the conditions of correct and
incorrect decisions followed by the same
bet, suggesting that reward anticipationin and of itself does not explain the activity
of SEF neurons. This is a good control in
their paradigm; however, the relation-
ships between reward anticipation and
the two-alternative forced choice of
bets might be more complicated than
the authors assumed. The relationships
betweenmetacognitive signal and reward
anticipation should be examined more
closely from various points of view in
future studies.
Metacognition-related neuronal activity
has been shown at the single-neuron level
in a few previous studies. In particular,
Kiani and Shadlen (2009) examined the
neuronal signal encoding choice certainty
in monkeys using an opt-out task para-
digm. First, the monkeys were presented
with moving dot stimuli with a given level
of coherence. Monkeys were then given
two forced choices, one of which indi-
cated the correct direction of the dot
motion and offered a reward. In half of
the trials, a third opt-out choice was also
presented in which the monkeys could
receive a smaller, but certain, reward
without choosing a direction. The authors
recorded single-unit activity in the lateral
intraparietal area (LIP) during this task
and found that when the animal chose
the opt-out option, the activity of LIP
neurons was intermediate (i.e., betweenNeuron 7the levels recorded when the correct
target was located in and outside of the
response field). The intermediate level
indicates that the activity did not encode
the saccadic target, suggesting that the
activity of LIP neurons reflected monkey’s
certainty regarding the perceived direc-
tion. In this paradigm, the animal’s deci-
sion and its monitoring could not be
temporally segregated. In the present
study, the decision stage and bet stage
were temporally segregated with the
linkage by the interstage period, so that
the authors could extract the neuronal
correlates of decision monitoring as a
metacognitive process. The authors in-
deed found that the majority of SEF
neurons that encoded decision moni-
toring during the interstage period also
coded for the decision itself at the deci-
sion stage (i.e., different activity between
correct and incorrect decisions) and dis-
cussed that the observed metacognitive
signal of SEF neurons might have evolved
from the decision signal. Both studies in
monkeys, however, opened an important
possibility that neuronal mechanisms
underlying metacognitive functions can
be tapped in the primate frontal and pari-
etal cortices at the single-neuron level by
devising an adequate behavioral para-
digm. Furthermore, in a pioneering work5, August 9, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 359
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strated that the activity of neurons in the
rat orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) matched
the model of the rat’s uncertainty re-
garding their own past decision. Meta-
cognitive signals in the corresponding
area in monkeys should thus be examined
in future studies, which will facilitate
our understanding of the relationships
between the metacognitive signals in
different brain areas (Figure 1C).
The strength of themetacognitive signal
observed in Middlebrooks and Sommer
(2012) was several spikes per second on
average, which is not a large proportion
of all the spikes fired by these neurons.
Therefore, readout mechanisms and the
behavioral impact of the observed meta-
cognitive signals should be considered
carefully. This is related to the issue of
across-areal neuronal circuitry for meta-
cognition, which would include the SEF,
LIP, and presumably OFC, among which360 Neuron 75, August 9, 2012 ª2012 Elsevianatomical connections have been identi-
fied (Figure 1C) (Cavada et al., 2000;
Lynch and Tian, 2006). Clarifying the
hierarchical relationships between these
areas and differentiating their roles in
metacognition should be the next step in
understanding the neuronal circuitry that
implements this cognitive process, which
we humans profoundly exploit to lead our
daily lives.
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A recent paper in Nature (Lim et al., 2012) describes the effects of melanocortin receptors in the nucleus
accumbens. The studies connect a hypothalamic peptide systemwith brain reward centers and show effects
on specific neuronal populations and behavioral components of mood.Food and Mood
It is hard to imagine something more inte-
grated with our mood state than eating.
The influences go in both directions, with
intake affecting mood and mood states
modulating eating. For example, depres-
sion can lead to either increases or
decreases in intake. As with all complex
neuropsychiatric conditions, elucidation
of basic neurobiological mechanisms is
a critical first step toward clarifying just
how the brain integrates eating with
emotions. A recent study from Robert
Malenka and colleagues published inNature identifies molecules, circuits, and
neuronal pathways by which hypotha-
lamic derived peptides can influence
hedonic states (Lim et al., 2012). Specifi-
cally, the study establishes mechanisms
by which stress can lead to reduced
intake and anhedonia.
Melanocortins and Their
Receptors—Taking a Hint from
Metabolism
The melanocortin agonist, alpha-MSH,
is derived from the precursor peptide
POMC. The POMC neurons of the arcuatenucleus form the ‘‘stop’’ side of the hypo-
thalamic feeding equation whereby acti-
vation of this population reduces intake.
The paraventricular nucleus of the hypo-
thalamus has been best studied as a site
where the melanocortin MC4 receptor
(MC4R) mediates these effects. However,
the MC4R is broadly expressed in the
brain, including the nucleus accumbens
and dorsal striatum. Early work showed
regulation of MC4R by opiates and a role
for striatal MC4R signaling in cocaine
reward (Alvaro et al., 2003; Hsu et al.,
2005), and more recent studies have
